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Summary
Policy makers will be in a better position to facilitate the transition from welfare to
work if they have a detailed understanding of the incentives facing the potential
indigenous workforce. Distinguishing the expected gains from becoming employed
(captured by the replacement rate) from the expected loss of becoming
unemployed (estimated in cost of job loss) is a prerequisite for developing a policy
framework which ensures that more indigenous workers have an incentive to look
for, secure and keep jobs. This paper uses the 1994 National Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Survey data to analyse the issues involved.
Incentives for indigenous Australians to work
The major work incentive issues raised by the literature are the effect of the
welfare system on search activity, the duration of unemployment, the take-up
rates to entitlements and the effect on the labour supply decisions of partners.
The first two issues are directly captured by the replacement rate and cost of job
loss measures.
• Ninety-four per cent of the indigenous unemployed aged 18-64 years were
receiving government benefits. This high take-up rate suggests that any
conclusions about the relationship between the benefit system and
unemployment are likely to be applicable to the majority of unemployed
indigenous Australians.
• The labour supply decisions of indigenous couples are highly correlated.
Among unemployed males, 91 per cent had partners who were either
unemployed or not in the labour force. Among unemployed females, 40 per
cent had partners who were either unemployed or not in the labour force.
Indigenous replacement rates
Replacement rates provide one summary measure of the incentive to work
in the presence of the social security system. In simple terms, it can be
considered to capture the immediate gains from employment for potential
members of the labour force. The closer a replacement rate is to one, the less
incentive an individual has to work. Replacement rates greater than one mean
that an individual has no monetary incentive to work as they can receive more
income from remaining outside employment. However, if working in a low paid job
today leads to substantial increases in future wages, then it is possible that a
person chooses to work despite the immediate financial disincentive.
• Replacement rates for single males and females are highest for those not in the
labour force but do not differ substantially between those in non-Community
Development Employment Projects (CDEP) employment or unemployment.
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• The average single indigenous male could expect to receive from unemployment
benefits 69 per cent of the average income of a single indigenous male in any
non-CDEP employment.
• Replacement rates were higher for females than males and higher for those
who were married or in a de facto relationship. The first result reflects the
lower earnings of females compared with males and the second, the fact that
the welfare system explicitly recognises the additional costs of supporting a
dependant spouse while employers do not.
• Among single males and females, about 20 per cent of individuals could expect
a higher income from welfare than from employment in non-CDEP work (that
is their replacement rate was greater than one). Among those in a partnered
relationship, the share was higher, 30 per cent for males looking for work with
a dependant partner and almost 80 per cent for females looking for work with a
dependant partner.
• The estimated replacement rates rise with the number of dependants, as the
welfare system pays additional benefits to larger families while employers do
not explicitly adjust their wages and salaries to take account of family
characteristics.
• Large differences in the replacement rates arise from changes in the
assumptions of how the alternative wage is calculated. This illustrates that the
incentive to work may be very sensitive to the type of work available in the local
labour market.
• Incentives to work do not vary much over the lifecycle for indigenous males.
Even though replacement rates are higher for older females, the results may be
very sensitive to the assumptions made about the alternative employment
available.
Cost of job loss among the indigenous employed
The cost of job loss is estimated for people who are currently employed. This
measure includes both the effects of duration of unemployment and the
replacement rate on the costs of unemployment to the individual. Our
calculations show that the costs of unemployment are particularly high for many
indigenous Australians because they tend to have longer durations of
unemployment.
• Previous research concludes that the cost of job loss has gone up for all
Australians over time but our calculations show that they were substantially
higher for the vast majority of the indigenous population than for Australians
in general in the early 1990s.
• The expected cost of job loss was particularly high, relative to the Australian
average, for partnered indigenous Australians because of their substantially
higher probability of being unemployed. So for example, the expected cost of
losing a job for a partnered indigenous male with no children was an income
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equal to 90 per cent of the income from full-year full-time work. Among all
Australian partnered males in employment, the low probability of becoming
unemployed meant that the equivalent statistic was 98 per cent.
Distinguishing the gains of becoming employed from the cost of
job loss
The main advantage of the methodology used here is that it allows us to
disaggregate the different incentives to find and stay in employment. For example,
while the monetary incentive to find work, as measured by replacement rates, is
lower for indigenous Australians, they have more to lose once they are employed
because of the long spells between jobs.
• One possible implication of this result is that indigenous workers may be more
reluctant to voluntarily quit than other employees. The resulting reduction in
labour force mobility may have adverse impacts on the suitability of job
matches in the indigenous workforce.
The level of change required in social security payments to provide an
incentive for all the indigenous workforce to find and keep a job is probably
politically and socially unacceptable. While the family payment reforms of the late
1980s and early 1990s provided some relief to the so-called 'working poor'
families, significant labour market disincentives persist for many indigenous
families.
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Introduction
A widely discussed issue in the period of high and persisting unemployment in
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries has
been the role of the welfare system in perpetuating unemployment. It has been
argued that high replacement rates, that is the ratio of welfare entitlement to the
hypothetical income that would be received if an individual had a job, have
adversely affected labour supply decisions particularly among those who are
unemployed. The purpose of this paper is to estimate replacement rates and the
cost of job loss for indigenous Australians and to examine some issues which
relate specifically to this group.
The replacement rate provides one summary measure of the incentive to
work in the presence of the social security system. In simple terms, it can be
considered to capture the immediate gains from employment for potential
members of the labour force. The closer a replacement rate is to one the less
incentive an individual has to work. Replacement rates greater than one mean
that an individual has no monetary incentive to work as they can receive more
income from remaining outside employment. However, if working in a low paid job
today leads to substantial increases in future wages, then it is possible that a
person may choose to work despite the immediate financial disincentive.
While the calculation of replacement rates is conceptually simple it requires
that the analyst models the whole social security and tax system in an attempt to
account for the family circumstances of each individual. The major innovation of
this study is to use the expected income from all types of work, including full-
time, part-time and part-year work, as the basis of the estimated wage a person
would receive if they found work. This recognises the fact that for many
indigenous people, the alternative to social security income is not the income
generated by a full-time job but rather the income expected from part-time,
seasonal or occasional work.
Given the complex nature of the incentives to work and the issue of the
availability of mainstream work opportunities for indigenous Australians, there
are other aspects of the tradeoff between employment and welfare which need to
be considered. These include the likelihood of gaining mainstream employment
and special opportunities for indigenous people to work in an indigenous
environment. In order to incorporate the first of these in our calculations, we have
estimated the cost of job loss, following Flatau and Hemmings (1993a, 1993b).
This measure includes both the effects of duration of unemployment and the
replacement rate on the costs of unemployment to the individual. Our
calculations show that the costs of unemployment are particularly high for some
indigenous Australians because they tend to have longer durations of
unemployment. An important issue in this context is the geographical distribution
of the indigenous population and access to mainstream labour markets.
A particular feature of the indigenous labour market is the Community
Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme. This further complicates the
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analysis of incentives facing indigenous Australians to search for mainstream
work. Under this scheme, indigenous communities get a grant similar to the
collective Newstart entitlement to undertake community development work. The
benefit recipients are then expected to work part-time for their entitlements.
Historically the CDEP scheme was available on a one-in-all-in basis for each
community. The current policy, which evolved gradually in the mid-1990s, means
that when the CDEP scheme is provided in a community, the unemployed have
the choice as to whether or not they participate in the scheme.
In 1994, there were 22,200 indigenous people participating in the CDEP
scheme, accounting for 26 per cent of indigenous employment (ABS/CAEPR
1996). The scheme, with its focus on indigenous community development and the
potential for earning additional income above an individual's benefit entitlement,
may act as a preferred alternative to mainstream employment activities for many
indigenous people even though the income they receive may be limited. For some,
the CDEP scheme may provide a vehicle for the development of labour market
skills and a transition from welfare dependence to mainstream employment.
The high level of welfare dependence among indigenous Australians has
been a long-standing focus of concern (see for example, Australian Government
1987). Policy makers will be in a better position to facilitate the transition from
welfare to work if they have a detailed understanding of the conflicting incentives
facing the potential workforce. Distinguishing the expected gains from becoming
employed, captured by the replacement rate, from the expected loss of becoming
unemployed, estimated in cost of job loss, is a prerequisite for developing a policy
framework which ensures that more indigenous workers have an incentive to look
for, secure and keep jobs.
The evidence on the relationship between replacement
rates and unemployment
There is an extensive international literature which calculates and compares
replacement rates and examines the links between the welfare system and
unemployment levels and durations (see Atkinson and Micklewright 1991;
Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991; Moffit 1992; Martin 1996). There remains
considerable difference in the emphasis writers place on the effect of the welfare
system on the level and duration of unemployment. One reason for these
differences is that each welfare system operates in a unique institutional context
which often makes it difficult to generalise across countries. While most writers
concede that the existence of welfare benefits are likely to reduce work effort and
employment search activity, there is considerable debate as to the extent of this
effect and also about its wider social implications.
One important result given the Australian system of unlimited
unemployment benefit entitlement is that open-ended systems are associated, all
else being equal, with longer unemploymentdurations than systems which place
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a time limit on the availability of welfare benefits (Layard, Nickell and Jackman
1991). These authors argue, however, that the rise in the replacement rate in
most European countries in the 1960s and 1970s contributed little to the growth
in unemployment over the period. Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) similarly
concluded in their survey of OECD countries that the replacement rate has a
small but significant effect on the probability of individuals leaving
unemployment.
Australian studies have produced varied results for the effect of the
replacement rate on unemployment. Gregory and Patterson (1983) and McGavin
(1987) using aggregate data, found a positive effect of the replacement rate on the
level of unemployment. Saunders, Bradbury and Whiteford (1989) using unit
record data, concluded that the unemployment benefit did not encourage the
employed to leave employment. They did, however, estimate high replacement
rates for those unemployed at the time of their study and acknowledged the
possibility that these may act as a disincentive to finding work. In a more recent
Australian study. Bradbury, Ross and Doyle (1991) calculate replacement rates
for 1986and 1991 and conclude that they had fallen substantially for young
people under the age of 18 years with changes in the eligibility rules.
Flatau and Hemmings (1993a, 1993b) extend the analysis of replacement
rates to calculate for Australia a cost of job loss measure which includes both the
standard replacement rate and the duration of unemployment. They use
aggregate level data to consider how the cost of becoming unemployed has
changed over the period 1973 to 1992. They conclude that for both single and
couple income units, the cost of becoming unemployed increased. Of particular
importance for this result was the increase in the average duration of
unemployment over the period, which contributed to the increased income
inequality between those with jobs and those without.
Among the important issues discussed in the literature is that of take-up
rates to entitlements (Atkinson and Micklewright 1991; Moffit 1992). Where
individuals do not take-up their welfare entitlements, the calculated replacement
rates may have no influence on behaviour. The evidence presented below suggests
that this is not an issue for indigenous Australians.
A further important effect of the welfare system may be on the labour supply
decisions of the partners of the unemployed. In means tested systems, such as
Australia, there is a disincentive for one partner to work when the other is
unemployed as this reduces the family's benefit entitlement. Available evidence
shows there is a correlation between the labour force status of partners (Miller
and Volker 1987; Miller 1989, 1997). Miller's (1997) study based on 1991
Australian Census data shows a positive correlation between the labour force
status of partners.
In summary, the major relevant issues for indigenous Australians raised by
the literature are the effect of the welfare system on search activity and the
related duration of unemployment and the effect on the labour supply decisions of
partners.
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Characteristics of indigenous Australians by labour force
status
In this section some descriptive data on the characteristics of unemployed
indigenous Australians are presented and these are related to some of the issues
raised in the literature. The data presented here come from the National
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey (NATSIS) conducted by the
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in 1994. The survey covered 15,700
indigenous people living in Australia and asked questions on a range of issues not
usually covered in ABS surveys.
The NATSIS used a wider definition of unemployment than that usually
adopted by the ABS. If people stated that they were registered with the
Commonwealth Employment Service (CES), they were counted among the
unemployed in the NATSIS but if they were taking no other steps to gain
employment, they would not be included in the ABS Monthly Labour Force Survey
(MLFS) definition of unemployment. Accordingly, only 72.8 per cent of those
classified as unemployed in the NATSIS would be counted as unemployed in the
MLFS. The remaining 27.2 per cent would have been included in the 'not in the
labour force' (NILF) category in the MLFS (for a fuller discussion of this issue see
Hunter 1996). A comparison of results using the two definitions shows that the
NATSIS definition tends to increase the number of long-term unemployed. The
results reported here are based on the NATSIS definition ofunemployment.
In this paper we have focused attention on the 18-64 age group. The
calculation of replacement rates for the 16-18 age group is complicated by the
need for information on their parent's incomes and assets so we have omitted
them from the current study. Compared with indigenous people employed in non-
CDEP work, the unemployed were younger, more likely to live outside the major
urban centres and had less education (Daly and Hunter 1998). In contrast, CDEP
scheme workers were heavily concentrated in remote areas and were relatively
older, but had similarly low levels of education.
Researchers in this area have pointed to the level of take-up of benefit
entitlement as an important factor determining the likely effect of the welfare
system on behaviour. The NATSIS data show that 94 per cent of the indigenous
unemployed aged 18-64 years were receiving government benefit. This high take-
up rate suggests that any conclusions about the relationship between the benefit
system and unemployment are likely to be applicable to the majority of
unemployed indigenous Australians.
One conclusion from the international literature was that welfare systems
without time limits on the availability of unemployment benefits were associated
with longer unemployment durations. Australia does experience relatively long
unemployment durations (Elliott 1991; Committee on Employment Opportunities
1993). About half of the unemployed indigenous Australians aged 15 years and
over had been out of work for more than 12 months (ABS/CAEPR 1996). The
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proportion who had been unemployed for more than a year was very similar
across all parts-of-State. More detailed calculations for those aged 18-64 years
show that over half of both males and females had been unemployed for more
than 18 months.1 A comparison of indigenous and other Australians on the basis
of MLFS data, shows 46 per cent of the indigenous unemployed to be long-term
unemployed compared with 37 per cent of other Australians (ABS/CAEPR 1996).
Long-term unemployment does, therefore, appear to be a particular problem for
indigenous Australians, although the extent of the contribution of the welfare
system to this outcome remains to be established.
Table 1. Couple where each indigenous spouse is aged 15-64: labour
force status of husband and wife, 1994
Wife
Husband
Employed
non- Un-
CDEP CDEP employed NILF Total
A.
Employed non-CDEP
CDEP
Unemployed
NILF
Total
41.3
11.7
7.9
9.2
19.3
5.6
35.7
0.9
3.8
9.9
9.2
6.1
29.6
9.9
14.7
43.9
46.5
61.5
77.0
56.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
B.
Employed non-CDEP
CDEP
Unemployed
NILF
Total
Number
66.5
12.2
12.0
9.3
100.0
5,341
17.5
72.2
2.7
7.5
100.0
2,745
19.4
8.3
59.1
13.2
100.0
4,064
24.3
16.7
32.2
26.8
100.0
15,489
31.1
20.1
29.3
19.5
100.0
27,640
Notes: Table population is all married couples where both indigenous partners are present in the
family unit. Unfortunately, the NATSIS did not collect data on the labour force status of non-
indigenous partners. Panel A reports the unconditional probability of a wife being in a labour
force state given the husband's labour force status. For example, the first line in Panel A
estimates the probability that a wife is employed non-CDEP, CDEP, unemployed and NILF
given that the husband works in non-CDEP employment. Panel B holds wife's labour force
status constant.
Source: NATSIS unit record file.
International evidence shows that a means tested benefit system affects the
labour supply decisions of the partners of the unemployed. Earlier Australian
research shows a correlation between the employment status of partners. Table 1
confirms this result for indigenous Australians; the largest percentages are in the
diagonal cells of the table. Among unemployed males, 91 per cent had partners
who were either unemployed or not in the labour force. Among unemployed
females, 40 per cent had partners who were either unemployed or not in the
labour force. These shares would increase with the inclusion of CDEP participants
among the unemployed.
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Results
Calculating hypothetical welfare entitlements and tax liability
In order to calculate the replacement rate and the cost of job loss, we need
estimates of potential earnings from employment for those unemployed and
detailed information about Department of Social Security (DSS) benefit
entitlements and the tax system. The calculations are quite detailed and a full
description of the methodology is included in the appendixes.
In general terms, the estimated welfare entitlement of each individual is
based on the social security rates reported in Table 2. Given that the income data
in the NATSIS covers the year to June 1994, the expected social security income
is based on the annualised entitlements at the 31 December 1993.The basic
social security entitlements are calculated as the sum of Jobsearch Allowance or
Newstart Allowance, Rent Assistance, Family Payments (Basic Family Payments
and Additional Family Payments) and Remote Area Allowance.
Table 2. Basic social security rates before Rent Assistance, Family
Payments and Remote Area Allowance, December 1993
per annum
Single 18-20 year-old with no dependants—at home $4,058.60
Single 18-20 year-old with no dependants—away from home $6,162.00
Single 21-59 year-old with no dependants $7,446.40
Single aged 60 years and over with no dependants $8,221.20
Single with children $8,221.20
Couple both 21+(each) $6,856.20
Couple partner 18-20 (each) $6,162.00
Couple partner less than 18 (each) $5,571.80
Source: A Guide to Social Security Payments. 20 September 1993 to 31 December 1993, DSS.
It is important to note that non-pecuniary benefits such as the Health Care
or Pensioner Concession Cards are not included in our calculations because their
value will depend upon uncertain events such as access to and need for health
care. This omission places a downward bias in the replacement rate. Daly and
Hunter (1998) provide details of the methodology used to predict the expected
wage from employment for the unemployed.
Incentives to find work across labour force states and family
types
Table 3 summarises the replacement rates for all labour force status groups
using two comparison groups; those employed in non-CDEP work and a subset of
these workers, those working full-time for a full-year. The first includes all
employment outcomes, such as the most likely work options for indigenous
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Australians of part-time and seasonal work, while the second is restricted to full-
year full-time work only. The first comparison group is preferred because the
opportunities for indigenous people to work full-time all year round may be
severely circumscribed in many areas.
Table 3. Indigenous replacement rates across all labour force states,
1994
Basis of sample for wage estimation_____ ___
No. of All non-CDEP Full-time,
observations workers full-year
Single adult Income units
Single males
All 1,791 0.69 (0.27) 0.54 (0.15)
CDEP 296 0.66 (0.20) 0.56 (0.14)
Unemployed 517 0.62 (0.19) 0.52 (0.13)
Non-CDEP 357 0.56 (0.19) 0.48 (0.13)
NILF 621 0.85 (0.32) 0.59 (0.16)
Single females
All 2,161 0.81 (0.24) 0.58 (0.13)
CDEP 153 0.76 (0.19) 0.60 (0.14)
Unemployed 461 0.74 (0.17) 0.58 (0.12)
Non-CDEP 374 0.68 (0.22) 0.52 (0.13)
NILF 1,173 0.89 (0.25) 0.60 (0.13)
Married/defacto Income units
If female partner is dependant (i.e. indigenous male partner looking for work)
All 1,939 0.91 (0.23) 0.81 (0.17)
CDEP 380 1.00 (0.24) 0.89 (0.18)
Unemployed 485 0.92 (0.21) 0.82 (0.16)
Non-CDEP 727 0.85 (0.20) 0.77 (0.16)
NILF 347 0.92 (0.25) 0.80 (0.17)
If male partner is dependant (i.e. indigenous female partner looking for work)
All 2,216 1.22 (0.29) 0.89 (0.18)
CDEP 221 1.31 (0.31) 0.98 (0.21)
Unemployed 300 1.18 (0.24) 0.90 (0.16)
Non-CDEP 504 1.10 (0.26) 0.83 (0.16)
NILF 1.191 1.27 (0.30) 0.89 (0.18)
Notes: Replacement rates for married income units are calculated by dividing the social security
entitlement of both partners by the expected net income from non-CDEP wages (and
consequent family payment entitlements when employed) of the partner looking for work.
Other family income from non-wage and non-government sources is neld constant throughout.
Standard deviations are in brackets. Given that there are 30 or more estimates of replacement
rates in all categories, we can estimate the standard errors using the usual formula (that is,
dividing the standard deviation by the square root of the number of observations, N) and test
for a significant difference between means by appealing to the central limit theorem. The
largest standard error for the replacement rates in this table is 0.02, but most are less.
Source: NATSIS unit record file: Daly and Hunter (1998); A Guide to Social Security Payments. 20
September 1993to 31 December 1993, DSS: and the Tax Pack for the financial year
1993/1994.
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Replacement rates are presented separately for single males and females
and for males and females who were members of a married or de facto
relationship. So, for example, the table shows that the average single indigenous
male could expect to receive from unemployment benefits 69 per cent of the
average income of a single indigenous male in any non-CDEPemployment. This
represents a higher replacement rate than in comparison with a full-time, full-
year worker. In this comparison, he could expect to receive from unemployment
benefits 54 per cent of the average income of a full-time full-year indigenous male
worker.
Looking at the breakdown by labour force status, Table 3 shows that the
average replacement rate for single males and females is highest for those NILF
but does not differ substantially between those in CDEP employment or
unemployment. As might be expected, the lowest replacement rates were for those
already in non-CDEP employment. The ranking across labour market states was,
however, less clear for those who were married or in a de facto relationship. While
those in non-CDEP employment faced the lowest replacement rates in each
comparison group, the ranking differed for the other three labour force status
groups.
Two other important features of the table are worth noting. Firstly, the
replacement rates were higher for females than males and higher for those who
were married or in a de facto relationship. The first result reflects the lower
earnings of females compared with males and the second, the fact that the welfare
system explicitly recognises the additional costs of supporting a dependant
spouse while employers do not. The replacement rates in excess of one for
partnered women show that their expected income was higher from welfare
payments than from all non-CDEP employment.
The average replacement rate reported in Table 3 may conceal important
variations between individuals depending on their particular characteristics. The
replacement rates are particularly high for a large share of individuals when the
alternative employment income used for the comparison is the expected income
from all non-CDEP employment. Among single males and females, about 20 per
cent of individuals could expect a higher income from welfare than from
employment in non-CDEP work (that is their replacement rate was greater than
one). Among those in a partnered relationship, the share was higher, 30 per cent
for males looking for work with a dependant partner and almost 80 per cent for
females looking for work with a dependant partner.
The replacement rates were lower if the alternative to welfare was full-time
full-year non-CDEP employment. While the replacement rates for most single
indigenous males and females were greater than 0.50, they were above one for
only a small group. Among those with partners, about 14 per cent of males and
24 per cent of females had replacement rates above one. Virtually all partnered
individuals had a replacement rate above 0.50.
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Table 4. Replacement rates for selected categories of indigenous
unemployed, 1994
Basis of sample for wage
estimation
No. of'
observ-
ations
(1)
All non-CDEP
workers"
(2)
Full-time,
full-year"
Single adult income units
Single males
18-20 year-old with no dependants 31 0.53 (0.13) 0.41
21-59 year-old with no dependants 243 0.50 (0.09) 0.43
1 dependant under 12 years-old 92 0.69 (0.18) 0.56
2-3 dependants under 12 years-old 79 0.76 (0.16) 0.59
4 plus dependants under 12 years-old 32 0.76 (0.13) 0.69
Single females
18-20 year-old with no dependants 32 0.55 (0.14) 0.42
21-59 year-old with no dependants 131 0.64 (0.13) 0.51
1 dependant under 12 years-old 111 0.77 (0.16) 0.59
2-3 dependants under 12 years-old 128 0.81 (0.15) 0.64
4 plus dependants under 12 years-old 28 0.87 (0.13) 0.74
Married/defacto income units
If female partner is dependant (i.e. indigenous male partner looking for work)
Couple with no dependants 468 0.91 (0.20) 0.81
1 dependant under 12 years-old 88 0.84 (0.15) 0.77
2-3 dependants under 12 years-old 171 0.98 (0.15) 0.84
4 plus dependants under 12 years-old 79 1.12 (0.15) 1.05
If male partner is dependant (i.e. indigenous female partner looking for work)
Couple with no dependants 279 1.16 (0.23) 0.89
1 dependant under 12 years-old 53 1.20 (0.26) 0.89
2-3 dependants under 12years-old 99 1.24 (0.20) 0.95
4 plus dependants under 12 years-old 32 1.30 (0.13) 1.06
(0.11)
(0.06)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.08)
(0.11)
(0.10)
(0.11)
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.16)
(0.10)
(0.11)
(0.12)
(0.16)
(0.14)
(0.12)
(0.10)
Notes: See Table 3.
Source: See Table 3.
Table 4 focuses more closely on the unemployed and presents replacement
rates for a range of family types. As in Table 3, the replacement rates reported
here rise with the number of dependants as the welfare system pays additional
benefits to larger families while employers do not explicitly adjust their wages and
salaries to take account of family characteristics. The average replacement rates
for both partnered males and females with dependant children were very high.
These results resonate with the findings of Bradbury, Ross and Doyle (1991).
Again, the replacement rates based on full-time, full-year employment are
significantly lower than the estimates based on all non-CDEP workers.
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The distribution of incentives to work
The distribution of financial incentives to work, represented by the
replacement rates, can also be displayed in graphical form. Figures 1 and 2
illustrate several major issues raised in the previous section. AppendixB includes
the equivalent graphs for married indigenous population.
First, female replacement rates are much higher than their male
counterparts in both the single and married indigenous populations. Not only is
the average replacement rate higher but the highest female replacement rate is
almost twice as large as the highest male ratio. There are several females in the
NATSIS sample whose expected wage is almost two-and-a-half times lower than
their social security entitlements. In contrast, the highest male wages are less
than one-and-a-half times lower than their respective social security entitlements.
As indicated above, this largely reflects the poor alternative wage available to
many indigenous females.
Second, many indigenous people, especially females, have little or no
incentive to look for work. The large proportion of the population with
replacement rates greater than one indicates that even if they found employment
the resulting wage would, more than likely, be less than their social security
entitlements (given the individual's family circumstances). The line drawn at one
on each graph is designed as a visual cue to assist the reader in estimating how
many people have no incentive to look for work. The proportion of the shaded area
to the right of this line indicates the percentage of the population whose expected
wage is less than social security entitlements. This observation is particularly
pronounced when the estimated replacement rates are calculated using the wages
from all non-CDEP scheme employment.
Finally, large differences in the replacement rates arising from changes in
the assumptions of how the alternative wage is calculated illustrate that incentive
to work may be very sensitive to the type of work available in the local labour
market. Comparison of Figures la and 2a to Figures Ib and 2b illustrate the
importance of assumptions about the type of work available. Virtually no males
have replacement rates over one when full-time, full-year work is assumed to be
available. However, if the alternative wage is based on the actual patterns of non-
CDEP scheme employment that is including part-time and casual employment,
there are substantial numbers of males with little or no incentive to look for work.
Therefore any assessment of the indigenous incentive to work cannot be viewed in
isolation from the state of the local labour market.
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Figure 1a. Distribution of replacement rates for single males, wages
estimated using all non-CDEP scheme employment
0.5 -
0.4 -
0.3 -
Fraction
0.2-
0.1 -
0.'5 f.O
Replacement rates
1.5
Note: Estimated wages calculated using income of all male non-CDEP employees.
Figure 1b. Distribution of replacement rates for single males, wages
estimated using full-time, full-year non-CDEP scheme employment
0.5 -
0.4 -
0.3 -
Fraction
0.2 -
0.1 -
0 -
0.5 1.51.0
Replacement rates
Note: Estimated wages calculated using income of full-time, full-year male non-CDEP employees.
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Figure 2a. Distribution of replacement rates for single females, wages
estimated using all non-CDEP scheme employment
0.3
0.2 -
Fraction
0.1 -
0 -
0.5 1.0 1.5
Replacement rates
2'.0 25
Note: Estimated wages calculated using income of all female non-CDEP employees.
Figure 2b. Distribution of replacement rates for single females, wages
estimated using full-time, full-year non-CDEP scheme employment
0.3J
0.2 -|
Fraction
0.1 -
0 -
0.5 1.0 1.5
Replacement rates
20 2.5
Note: Estimated wages calculated using income of full-time, full-year female non-CDEP employees.
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Incentives to work across the lifecycle
In almost all industrialised countries workers are leaving the labour force at
younger ages. While that trend is most evident for men, participation is also
declining for older women. Gruber and Wise (1997) suggested that one of the
major factors behind this trend is international increases in the average level of
social security since the 1960s. While there is insufficient data available to
directly address Gruber and Wise's proposition for indigenous Australians, it is
possible to examine replacement rates for the older indigenous population relative
to their younger counterparts at the time of the NATSIS. Specifically, this section
examines whether there is any substantial difference in the level of social security
entitlements for indigenous Australians, relative to the potential wage received in
the labour market, over the lifecycle (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Indigenous replacement rates over the lifecycle based on all
non-CDEP employment income, 1994
Single males
Single females
Married males
Marriedfemales
21 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 44 45 to 54
Age(years)
55 to 64 65 plus
Note: The replacement rates in this figure are based on all NATSIS respondents in the particular age
group. It is not possible to estimate the ratios for any sub-group because of the low numbers
involved.
Figure 3 illustrates two major issues. First, that incentives to work do not
vary much over the lifecycle for indigenous males. Second, even though
replacement rates are higher for older females, the results may be very sensitive
to the assumptions made about the alternative employment available.
The above graph illustrates how the replacement rate declines very
gradually for workers until age 54 where it begins to rise again. The increase in
replacement rates among older people is more marked for females than it is for
males. Indeed, male wages, relative to welfare entitlements, do not vary much over
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the lifecycle. The large difference in labour market participation of older, as
opposed to younger, indigenous males does not appear to be related to
disincentive provided by social security payments being at high levels. Therefore,
the cross sectional evidence for indigenous males in NATSIS does not support
Gruber and Wise's (1997) hypothesis. Tinkering with welfare entitlements will not
significantly alter older indigenous males' incentive to work relative to the younger
population.
Rather than focus on financial incentives to work among older indigenous
Australians, it is probably more profitable to examine the causes of lack of
employment opportunity among such groups. Relative to other Australians the
older indigenous males have extremely low employment rates in mainstream
employment with less than one-quarter (24.4 per cent) of 54 to 64 year-olds being
in non-CDEP work in 1996 (Hunter and Gray 1998). This is less than half the
equivalent statistic for non-indigenous males in the immediate pre-retirement
years. The mainstream employment rate for indigenous females in that age group
(14.9 per cent) is just over half of their non-indigenous counterparts.2 It is clear
that the lack of opportunity to work is far more important than financial
disincentives of welfare entitlements.
The second point to arise from Figure 3 is that the alternative wage for older
females appears to be particularly low compared to their younger counterparts.
Notwithstanding prima facie evidence that the incentive to work falls for older
indigenous females, there is no sign of a significant decline in participation among
such women in recent years (Hunter and Gray 1998). In addition, the support for
Gruber and Wise's hypothesis is further weakened by the fact that the result for
older women is reversed if the alternative wage is based on full-time, full-year
employment. However, these lower replacement rates for older women should be
treated with caution given the very small number of older women working either
full-time or full-year.
Clearly, more research is required to identify the reason for these relatively
low female wages before policy conclusions can be reached. If low wages are due
to discrimination by employers then altering welfare entitlements rationalises
such employer behaviour. Alternatively, if it is due to poor educational
endowments of older indigenous females, then it may be more appropriate to
address deficiencies rather than place further burden on a disadvantaged group.
The cost of job loss
These estimates of replacement rates for indigenous Australians do not take
into account another aspect of unemployment, namely its duration. This is
accounted for in both the cost of job loss (CCJLR) conditioned upon losing a job
and the expected cost of job loss (ECJLR) given the probability of remaining in
employment for those who are employed. As noted in the definitions of these
terms in Appendix A, a value close to one suggests that the costs are minimal
while smaller ratios suggest larger costs.
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Table 5 presents a comparison of these measures for indigenous Australians
and all Australians (for further detailed results see Appendix Cl).3 The latter
estimates are taken from Flatau and Hemmings (1993a). In general, the cost of
job loss, as measured by the extent to which a CCJLR is less than one, was lower
for indigenous Australians than for all Australians. For example, conditional on
losing their job, an indigenous male with a spouse and no children could expect
to receive 82 per cent of their full-year full-time employment income over a two-
year time period. All Australians in this category could expect only 64 per cent of
their full-year full-time employment income given that they had lost their job. The
relatively low employment income available to indigenous Australians, evident in
the high replacement rates, outweighs the effect of the longer duration of
unemployment. The main exception to this generalisation is indigenous youth
under 21, whose low retention rates at school will distort their duration of
unemployment relative to the rest of the population.4
Table 5. Conditional and expected cost of job loss for indigenous and all
Australians, 1992 and 1994
Conditional cost of
job loss
Indig.
(i)
All
Aust's
(2)
Ratio
U)/(2)
(3)
Expected cost of
Job loss
Indlg. A l l R a t i o
Ausfs (4)/(5)
(4) (5) (6)
Single adult income units
Single males 18 to 29: at home
Single males 18 to 20: Independent
Single males over 20: no children under 12
Male sole parent: one child
Single females 18 to 20: at home
Single females 18 to 20: independent
Single females over 20: no children under 12
Female sole parent: one child
0.74'
0.73
0.84
0.70
0.71
0.82
0.81
0.88
0.64
0.71
0.83
0.91
0.74
0.82
0.84b
1.14
1.18
0.80
0.96
1.0
0.81a
0.83
0.89
0.79
0.85
0.89
0.96
0.97
0.97
0.98
0.96
0.98
0.98
0.99
0.84b
0.86
0.91
0.81
0.87
0.90
Married/dcfacto income units
Couple with no children: male loses job
Couple with no children: female loses job
Couple with one child: male loses job
Couple with two children: male loses job
Couple with three children: male loses job
Couple with four children: male loses job
0.82
0.85
0.86
0.95C
0.96
0.64
0.82
0.75
0.79
0.83
0.87
1.28
1.04
1.15
1.17"
1.10
0.90
0.93
0.92
0.97C
0.97
0.98
0.99
0.98
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.92
0.94
0.94
0.98d
0.98
Notes: a. These figures include both the 'at home' and 'independent' benefit entitlements. The
calculations distinguish whether or not an individual was at home but the number in
each category was too small to report separately.
b. This ratio takes an average of the 'at home' and 'independent' benefit entitlements for all
Australians.
c. These figures are for indigenous couple with either two or three children.
d. This ratio takes an average for all Australians with either two or three children. The
costs of job loss from Flatau and Hemmings (1993a) are for the second quarter in 1992.
This was done to minimise seasonal fluctuations between their estimates and our
NATSIS-based estimated since the survey was conducted in June 1994. SeeAppendix
Table C1 for more details on the calculations for indigenous Australians.
Sources: AppendixTable Cl; Flatau and Hemmings (1993a).
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Among those with partners, the cost of job loss, as measured by a CCJLR,
was much lower for all Australians than for indigenous Australians. This reflects
the high replacement rates of partnered unemployed indigenous Australians,
reflecting their lack of skills and low earning power in non-CDEP employment.
In contrast, the cost of job loss as measured by the ECJLR, is much higher
for indigenous Australians. The expected cost of job loss was particularly high,
relative to the Australian average, for partnered indigenous Australians because
of their substantially higher probability of being unemployed. So for example, the
expected cost of losing a job for a partnered indigenous male with no children was
an income equal to 90 per cent of the income from full-year full-time work. Among
all Australian partnered males in employment, the low probability of becoming
unemployed meant that the ECJLR was 0.98.
The reason for this apparent paradox is that CCJLR is conditional upon a
person losing their job whereas the ECJLR measures the expected income relative
to what a person would receive if they stayed in employment continuously.
Therefore, higher durations of unemployment inflate the expected cost of job loss
for indigenous people by reducing the steady state probability of remaining in
employment. Put another way, while the monetary incentive to find work once
they lose a job is lower for indigenous Australians, they have more to lose once
they are employed because of long spells between jobs.
Flatau and Hemmings (1993b) conclude that the cost of job loss has gone
up for all Australians over time, but these calculations show that they were
substantially higher for single indigenous males and females than for Australians
in general in the early 1990s.
Concluding remarks
This paper presents two related estimates of the relationship between the welfare
system and potential earnings from employment for indigenous Australians. The
first set of results calculates replacement rates from data from the NATSIS and
DSS information. These results show that if expected employment income is
taken as the average for indigenous Australians not working in the CDEP scheme,
that is it includes part-time and part-year work, then the replacement rate for
many indigenous Australians is high and their monetary incentive to work is
therefore low. The broad summary of these findings is that replacement rates are
highest for those with partners and dependant children and lowest for single
people. The estimated replacement rates are higher for females than males. This
result of high replacement rates for females was also found for indigenous female
sole parents in an earlier study of replacement rates (Daly 1992).
The large difference in replacement rates arising from the choice of the basis
for the expected employment income has important implications for future
research into the incentive to work. The prevalence of part-time, casual and
seasonal work among indigenous workers either indicates that they are
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constrained from finding full-time work or choose to supply their labour on a
part-time basis. Given the low educational status of many indigenous workers
and their marginalised status in the labour market, it would be misleading to
overemphasise their employment choices. If the only jobs offered in the local
labour market involve part-time and casual work, then estimated replacement
rates should reflect this fact. This point has wider implications. The general
increases in part-time employment in the Australian workforce highlights the
importance of calculating replacement rates for both types of employment in
future analysis.
Earlier studies emphasise two conclusions; higher replacement rates are
associated with longer unemployment durations and the labour force status of
partners is closely related. The evidence presented here conforms with these
results. Indigenous Australians have relatively high replacement rates and long
unemployment durations and the labour force status of partners is closely
correlated.
The exact implications of the results presented here for labour market
behaviour remain an empirical question. It is possible that even a high
replacement rate may have a limited effect on people's decision about whether or
not to seek employment. However, given the large proportion of indigenous
Australians with high replacement rates, it seems probable that they have some
effect on job search activity, especially when it is remembered that for those living
in remote areas, mainstream employment may involve shifting locations. It is
important to remember that there may also be many other reasons why
indigenous Australians have high unemployment rates, for example their
geographical dispersion, any discrimination against them and lifestyle
preferences.
Given the limited variation in replacement rates evident over the lifecycle,
especially for males, it would be unwise to place too much emphasis on the role of
incentives in determining indigenous employment outcomes. The particularly low
employment and participation rates among the older indigenous population is
likely to be driven by other factors such as the availability of suitable work and
poor educational attainment, rather than the high rates of social security
payments relative to the alternative wage.
An extension of the replacement rate to include duration of unemployment
is presented in the cost of job loss ratios. They show that the expected cost of job
loss is higher for indigenous Australians than for all Australians because of their
longer unemployment durations and subsequent higher probability of being
unemployed.
The main advantage of Flatau and Hemming's (1993a, 1993b) methodology
is that it allows us to disaggregate the different incentives to find and stay in
employment. For example, while the monetary incentive to find work, as
measured by replacement rates and CCJLR, is lower for indigenous Australians,
they have more to lose once they are employed because of the long spells between
jobs. One possible implication of this result is that indigenous workers may be
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more reluctant to voluntarily quit than other employees. The resulting reduction
in labour force mobility may have adverse impacts on the suitability of job
matches in the indigenous workforce. Further research into indigenous labour
supply will be required before it is possible to square this prediction with the
actual behaviour of indigenous workers.
A feature of the welfare system is that as the number of dependants
increases so does the size of the welfare payment. This creates high replacement
rates for this group of unskilled workers with high levels of fertility. A sudden
change in the size of welfare payments may reduce the replacement rate but
create major problems for some indigenous people who may remain unable to find
employment. Such a policy change might, for example, create the need for
migration from traditional lands in search of work. Given their low level of labour
market skills, there may be limited employment opportunities for many
indigenous Australians.
The level of change required in the social security payments required to
provide an incentive for all the indigenous workforce to find and keep a job is
probably politically and socially unacceptable. While the family payment reforms
of the late 1980s and early 1990s provided some relief to the so-called 'working
poor' families, significant labour market disincentives persist for many indigenous
families. In addition, many single indigenous people and childless couples, who
did not benefit directly from these reforms, have little incentive to find work. The
fact that these reforms were designed to minimise disincentive effects should be
carefully noted by any policy makers who believe there are any easy solutions to
the ongoing poor outcomes in indigenous wages and employment.
The CDEP scheme offers an alternative to long-term unemployment and an
important opportunity for indigenous Australians to gain work experience in an
indigenous environment. While it may do little to reduce indigenous dependence
on government income support, it may be important in creating a different culture
and attitude toward this income support.
The replacement rate and the cost of job loss ratios can be changed by
reducing benefits, raising potential employment income or reducing
unemployment duration. The latter require that indigenous Australians gain more
labour market skills and that any barriers to employment, such as racial
discrimination, are reduced. These are major long-term goals for policy.
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Notes
1. The calculations are based on the NATSIS unit record file and assume that those
unemployed in the open ended category of 'greater than 12 months' have been out of
work for 18 months.
2. The 1996 Census indicates non-indigenous employment among males and females
was 54.4 and 28.6 per cent respectively.
3. The Flatau and Hemmings (1993a) calculations relate to all Australians and therefore
include indigenous Australians. As they account for 1-2 per cent of the population,
their inclusion in the aggregate should not greatly affect the comparison.
4. The other exception is single indigenous females over 20 year-old whose CCJLR is
slightly lower than for other single females.
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Appendix A. Calculating the replacement rate and the cost
of job loss
This appendix provides details of the basis for the calculations of replacement
rates and the cost of job loss presented in Tables 3 to 5. As much of the same
information is required to calculate the replacement rate and the cost of job loss,
we will begin this appendix by defining these terms before outlining the
methodology adopted to measure each.
The simple replacement rate can be defined as
RR = B + P-T1
E + P-T2
where B is the benefit entitlement given family characteristics, E is earnings from
employment, P is means tested family payments, Tl and T2 are the income taxes
associated with each income level and given the progressive nature of the tax
system, Tl <T2. It measures the extent to which welfare income will replace
employment earnings in any given time period.
The Conditional Cost of Job Loss Ratio (CCJLR) takes into account an
additional effect of unemployment, namely the duration of the unemployment
spell. In the interests of comparability with the study by Flatau and Hemmings
(1993a, 1993b), we have considered the cost of spells of unemployment over a
two-year period using the following formula
CCJLR = (Cl -T1) + (C2-T2)
(Fl -T1) + (F2-T2)
where Cl = D*UB + (52 - D)*F in year 1 and C2 is defined in a similar manner for
year 2. D is the average duration of unemployment, UB is the social security
payment when unemployed, F is the full employment income and T is the tax
payable in each circumstance. When D>52 weeks, it has been constrained to
equal 52 for Cl and the excess transferred to the estimate of C2. The closer this
measure is to one, the smaller the costs that will be incurred by job loss.
In addition to calculating the above measure conditional onunemployment,
Flatau and Hemmings (1993a, 1993b) calculate another ratio, the Expected Cost
of Job Loss Ratio (ECJLR) which measures the income loss a currently employed
worker might expect given the existing duration of unemploymentspells and the
probability of becoming unemployed.
ECJLR = P|(F1 - Tl) + (F2 - T2) 1+ (1 - P)[ (Cl - Tl) + (C2 - T2)l
[(Fl - Tl) + (F2 - T2)j
where P is the probability of being employed and all the other variables are
defined as above. Once again, the closer the ECJLR is to one, the smaller the
expected loss from unemployment.The interpretation of both of the cost of job
loss estimates are analogous with that of a replacement rate. The major difference
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is that a closer a replacement rate is to one the lower the expected gains from
employment.
The treatment of social security income and tax payments
The Australian benefit system is means tested with both an asset and
income test component so one issue is the extent to which indigenous Australians
would be eligible for the full benefits. Evidence from the NATSIS suggests that the
assets test for additional family payment would not be binding. Indeed, according
to this survey no indigenous person has more than $22,000 income from non-
government and non-wage sources and the vast majority of the indigenous
population have no such income. The Additional Family Payment Assets limit of
$363,500 is therefore extremely unlikely to be exceeded by anybody in our
sample.
There are a number of other components to total benefit entitlement. The
Family Payments for social security recipients are calculated solely using the
number and age of children. Basic Family Payment entitlements are estimated to
be $20.90 per fortnight per child for the first three children and $27.90 per
fortnight for each child after that. Additional Family Payment entitlements are
estimated as $61.90 per fortnight for each child under 13 and $87.40 per
fortnight for each child between 13 and 15 years of age. Since family payments
are not paid for students receiving Austudy or Abstudy we assume there is no
entitlement for full-time students over 16 years of age.
Rent Assistance entitlements are based on increments of 75 cents per dollar
above minimum rent thresholds detailed in Appendix Table Al. The maximum
Rent Assistance payable varies between $1,664.00 and $2,215.20 depending on
the family circumstance.
Appendix Table Al. Rent Assistanceper annum, December 1993
Partnered no children
Partnered and separated
Partnered and illness
separated
Partnered 1 or 2 children
Partnered 3+ children
Single no children
Single 1 or 2 children
Single 3+ children
Note: Rent Assistance increments
Maximum rent
assistance
$1,664.00
$1,664.00
$1,768.00
$1,944.80
$2,215.20
$1,768.00
$1,944.80
$2,215.20
by 75c per dollar above
Minimum rent Maximum rent
threshold
$2,636.40
$1,580.80
$1,580.80
$3,161.60
$3,161.60
$1,580.80
$2,106.00
$2,106.00
minimum rent threshold.
threshold
$4,854.98
$3,799.30
$3,938.22
$5,754.58
$6,115.20
$3,938.22
$4,698.98
$5,059.60
Remote Area Allowance is allocated to all indigenous people living in remote
Australia (which is defined as a rural or remote area in the part-of-State
classification that is more than 100 kilometres from the nearest Technical and
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Further Education college). This entitlement was determined as $455.00 for a
single person, $390.00 for each member of a couple and $182.00 for each child or
student. All social security entitlements arising directly from the presence of
children, including Family Payments, are split between partners.
Gross annual income from employment can be estimated from the NATSIS
data but for the individual, post-tax income is the best estimate of the benefits of
employment compared with social security income. Welfare recipients with no
other sources of income do not pay tax. The expected personal tax liability is
estimated using the tax rates and Medicare levy used in the 1993-94 financial
year. Tax rebates of $1,425.00 for each dependant child or student, $1,188.00 for
dependant spouse or housekeeper and $1,116.00 for Sole Parents are netted out
from this liability if a person is included in the tax system. If a person pays less
tax than these rebates then no tax is deducted from expected income. For people
living in a remote area, the potential tax rebates are estimated as $338.00 plus 50
per cent extra to the dependant rebates listed above. Expected family income for
the hypothetical situation where an unemployed or CDEP worker becomes
employed in a non-CDEP scheme job is calculated using the actual family income,
less a person's own wage and income from government payments, and adding the
expected wage income from non-CDEP scheme employment.
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Appendix B. Distributions of replacement rates
Figure Bla. Distribution of replacement rates for married/defacto
income units, indigenous male partner looking for work, 1994
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Note: Estimated wages calculated using income of all male non-CDEP employees.
Figure Bib. Distribution of replacement rates for married/defacto
income units, indigenous male partner looking for work, 1994
0.5-
0.4 -
0.3-
Fraction
0.2-
0.1 -
o -
05 1.0 1.5
Replacement rates
Note: Estimated wages calculated using income of full-time, full-year male non-CDEPemployees.
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Figure B2a. Distribution of replacement rates for married/defacto
income units, indigenous female partner looking for work, 1994
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Note: Estimated wages calculated using Income of all female non-CDEP employees.
Figure B2b. Distribution of replacement rates for married/defacto
income units, indigenous female partner looking for work, 1994
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Note: Estimated wages calculated using income of full-time, full-year female non-CDEP employees.
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Appendix C. Estimating the cost of indigenous job loss
Table C1. Conditional and expected cost of job loss, 1994
Unempl-
No. of oyment
observ- duration Prob.
ations (months) (employ) CCJLR ECJLR
Single adult income units
Single males
18-20 year-old with no dependants 19 10.45 0.28 0.74 0.81
21-59 year-old with no dependants 218 11.07 0.38 0.73 0.83
1 dependant under 12 years-old 64 10.29 0.30 0.84 0.89
2-3 dependants under 12 years-old 32 9.89 0.19 0.89 0.91
4 plus dependants under 12 years-old 9 11.90 0.15 0.93 0.94
All males in non-CDEP employment 1085 11.06 0.39 0.83 0.89
Single females
18-20 year-old with no dependants 19 12.23 0.30 0.70 0.79
21-59 year-old with no dependants 157 12.24 0.48 0.71 0.85
1 dependant under 12 years-old 94 11.55 0.37 0.82 0.89
2-3 dependants under 12 years-old 71 11.20 0.30 0.85 0.90
4 plus dependants under 12 years-old 16 11.89 0.28 0.89 0.92
All females in non-CDEPemployment 878 11.46 0.44 0.81 0.89
Married/defacto income units: only one partner employed
Couple with no dependants
male losses job 224 11.87 0.46 0.82 0.90
female losses job 198 11.73 0.51 0.85 0.93
Couple with 1 dependant under 12 years-old
male losses job 157 12.26 0.48 0.86 0.92
female losses job 105 11.89 0.52 0.94 0.97
Couple with 2-3 dependants under 12 years-old
male losses job 267 11.71 0.47 0.95 0.97
female losses job 157 12.02 0.48 0.94 0.97
Couple with 4 plus dependants under 12years-old
male losses job 70 11.81 0.34 0.95 0.97
female lossesjob 34 11.42 0.35 096 097
Note: The DSS rates and the average unemployment duration are used in conjunction with the pre-
tax full employment income, F, to calculate the income conditional upon the loss of one's
current job. Following Flatau and Hemmings (1993a, 1993b), F is based on the expected full-
time non-CDEP wages calculated using equation (2) in Daly and Hunter (1998). There is not
sufficient observations to separately estimate wages for under 21 year-olds living at home.
However, the calculations of DSS entitlements factor in the different entitlements of youth who
live at or away from home. In order to make comparisons with Flatau and Hemmings similar
assumptions are made: the Medicare levy is omitted from the tax liability, remote area tax
rebates are not included in the calculations and remote allowances are excluded from social
security entitlements. Sensitivity analysis of the results indicate that variations of these
assumptions do not alter the results substantively. The ECJLR is calculated for non-CDEP
employees.
Source; Daly and Hunter (1998).
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